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Introduction 
 Paradoxes have always been and remain a source of fascination and anxiety.  On 
one hand, their enigmatic nature challenges our creativity and inspires our imagination.  
On the other hand, paradoxes appear to be a compelling evidence of some fundamental 
structural limitations of our capacity to know.1 
 The interest in paradoxes goes all the way back to the early periods of human 
civilization.  All major philosophers of Ancient Greece were keenly interested in 
paradoxes.  The so-called “insolublia” were extremely popular during the Scholastic age.  
Modern age thinkers held an equal admiration for paradoxes.  Paradoxes also continue to 
attract much attention in our time. 
 The source of this enduring interest is the fact that in a deceptively simple way 
paradoxes raise one question that is crucially important to human civilization:  Are there 
any inherent limitations to human thought?  Is there anything that we, humans, absolutely 
cannot know as a matter of principle, rather than as a result of a flawed approach?  Some 
of the best minds in the history of humanity have tried to solve the mystery of paradox.  
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Yet paradox has successfully resisted all attempts at understanding its nature; its secrets 
remain as impenetrable today as they have been throughout centuries.   
 Definitions of paradox are numerous and diverse.  They range from simple to 
complex, from descriptive to analytical, from intuitive to formal.  In his recent book on 
the history of paradox, Ray Sorensen, who traces paradoxes to the riddles of Greek 
folklore, describes them as “questions . . . that suspend us between too many good 
answers.”2  R. M. Sainsbury defines paradox as “an apparently unacceptable conclusion 
derived by apparently acceptable reasoning from apparently acceptable premises.”3  In 
her exploration of paradoxes, Marianne Lewis writes:  “’Paradox’ denotes contradictory 
yet interrelated elements—elements that seem logical in isolation but absurd and 
irrational when appearing simultaneously.”4 
 There seems to be one distinct feature to which many definitions of paradox 
point:  paradoxes are about truths that are true but their truth is impossible to prove.  One 
of the most famous of all paradoxes, the Liar Paradox, is a good illustration of this point.5  
The Liar tells the truth only if he lies, and lies only if he tells the truth.  The Liar seems to 
be doing the impossible from the point of common logic:  he tells truth and lie at the 
same time. 
 Many thinkers have made attempts at understanding the source of paradoxes.  
There are two principal positions on this point.  Both of them reflect the traditional 
dualistic approach.  According to one of these positions, which may be called realist, 
paradoxes are rooted in the paradoxical nature of reality which is grounded in tensions 
and contradictions.  The other position, which may be called constructivist, argues that 
paradoxes are products of human thought.  Heraclites, for example, argued that paradoxes 
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were part of reality; they were due to the actual existence of many truths.  Parmenides, on 
the other hand, attributed paradoxes to human frailties and inconsistencies which resulted 
from the reliance on imperfect and deceptive senses.  Aristotle also regarded paradoxes as 
errors in human thinking, either involuntary or intentional.  In his view, paradoxes were 
either fallacies or rhetorical devices that could be used in disputations in order to confuse 
the opponent.  Rationalists saw paradoxes as a product of human failure to have adequate 
a priori insights.  Empiricists insisted that they were due to riddles of nature itself that our 
mind simply could not resolve.  Humans, they argued, must have wisdom and maturity to 
recognize those riddles which the human mind could understand and those about which it 
would remain forever ignorant.  For Existentialists, the very tensions and contradictions 
of human existence generated paradoxes. 
 The dichotomy between realism and constructivism is also present in the current 
discussions of paradox.  In his study of paradoxes, Roy Sorensen has argued in favor of 
fundamental cognitive flaws as the source of paradoxes.6  By contrast, R. M. Sainsbury 
has been critical of the emphasis on overarching cognitive patterns in explaining 
paradoxes and has been forcefully arguing in favor of realism and the actual existence of 
many truths.7 
 Philosophers have not been the only ones who have been interested in paradoxes.  
Many disciplines display a keen interest in this subject.  Psychology, for example, pays 
much attention to cognitive aspects of paradoxes.  Organizational Studies are also vitally 
interested in understanding paradoxes which are viewed as “contradictions embedded 
within a statement, human emotions, or organizational practices.”  Rather than regard 
paradoxes in a negative light—as a problem that needs to be resolved—many disciplines 
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view paradoxes in a positive way as crucial factors in the construction of knowledge.   
Some actually embrace paradoxes and focus on their production and utilization.  Ford and 
Backoff, for example, see that paradoxes can be used for advancing knowledge.  In their 
view, paradoxes can be constructed by bringing “oppositional tendencies . . . into 
recognizable proximity through reflection of interaction.”8  Sainsbury also associates 
paradoxes with crises and revolutionary advances in thought.9 
 Kurt Gödel, the celebrated Austrian logician and mathematician, has made 
probably the most important and far-reaching contribution toward our understanding of 
paradoxes.  In 1931 Gödel published a ground-breaking paper that proved to be in many 
ways revolutionary.  Gödel wrote this paper to address what was then one of the major 
problems in mathematics and logic—the problem of consistency.  As formulated by the 
German mathematician David Hilbert the question that Gödel addressed was briefly this:  
Is it possible to construct an absolute proof of consistency of an axiomatic system?  That 
is, is it possible to construct a proof that all true statements in a given system are 
consistent with its axioms? 
 In his article Gödel proved in a very ingenious and absolutely incontrovertible 
way that such proof was in principle impossible.  He showed that any deductive system 
could have sentences which, although true, were indemonstrable; in other words, their 
truth could not be proved within the given set of axioms and rules of inference and hence, 
from the perspective of this system, they were not true.  In order to demonstrate their 
truth, one would have to resort to meta-mathematical procedures and construct a new and 
broader axiomatic structure which was sufficiently powerful to construct such proof.  
However, even a new structure would still allow a possibility of constructing new 
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sentences which, although true, could not be proven within this structure.  Gödel’s proof 
showed the inherent limitations of the deductive method, which was and continues to 
dominate the sciences as the principal method for demonstrating truth.  Gödel’s proof 
suggested a paradoxical conclusion that was encouraging and frustrating at the same 
time:  although the power of human mind to generate knowledge seemed to be infinite, it 
could not devise a system for controlling this power.10 
 Among many other things, Gödel’s contribution has interesting implications for 
our understanding of the nature of paradox.  For example, Gödel has shown that within 
any cognitive structure11 it is possible to construct knowledge that transcends this 
structure and cannot be controlled by it.  In order to control this knowledge one has to 
construct a new and more powerful structure.  In other words, what Gödel’s contribution 
suggests is that paradoxes emerge when two cognitive structures—one more powerful 
than the other—intersect and the less powerful cognitive structure is perturbed by the 
emerging more powerful one which is capable of formally proving the controversial 
truths indemonstrable within the old structure.  Therefore, an understanding of paradoxes 
and their function is closely related to the study of cognitive structures and their 
evolution. 
 It is beyond the scope of this paper to deal with the evolution of cognitive 
structures.  I would direct the reader to the works of Piaget and my own discussion of this 
topic.12  Rather, what I would like to do in this paper is to concentrate on a clash between 
cognitive structures in a real paradox. 
The Paradoxical Universe of Modern Physics 
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 Paradoxes are abundant in contemporary physics.  One could start with the fact 
that it provides two very different and largely incompatible descriptions of physical 
reality—one by general relativity (GR) and another by quantum theory (QT).  The 
principal approaches and physical laws that operate in one description are largely 
inapplicable in another.  QT practically ignores the principle of invariability of frames of 
reference that is central to GR.  Phenomena, such as non-locality, entanglement, 
superposition, complementarity, randomness, which are predicted and verified by QT, are 
unobservable in GR. 
 The universe described by QT appears to make absolutely no sense when viewed 
outside its formalism. For example, how can one make sense of non-locality which 
involves speeds faster than the speed of light, an absolute constant in GR?  Or, what 
should one make of superposition, according to which a quantum system can be in two 
different states at the same time. The contradictions with our familiar sense of how 
physical reality operates are so great that even many who are intimately familiar with QT 
find its puzzles hard to comprehend.  Richard Feynman, who received a Nobel Prize for 
his achievements in QT, cautioned:   
Do not keep saying to yourself, if you can possible avoid it, “But how can it be 
like that?” because you will get 'down the drain,' into a blind alley from which 
nobody has yet escaped. Nobody knows how it can be like that.13 
 Of all the paradoxes associated with QT, the paradox of Schrödinger’s cat is one 
of the most famous.  In 1935 the famous Austrian physicist Arnold Schrödinger 
formulated the following Gedankenexperimente:  Imagine a cat sitting inside a 
hermetically sealed box which is connected to a container with a poisonous gas.  The 
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valve in this connection is controlled by a quantum system:  if the system is in one state, 
the valve remains closed and the cat stays alive; if the system is in another allowable 
state, the valve opens and the cat dies.  The problem is, however, that according to QT, a 
quantum system can be in two different superimposed states at the same time.  Therefore, 
when the system is in such state, the cat should also be alive and dead at the same time.  
It is all right to accept the mathematical formalism that allows quantum system to be in 
two different states at the same time, but one finds it very difficult to accept a possibility 
of a cat being in two such different states as alive and dead at the same time. 
 Numerous attempts to provide an alternative to what is called the standard or 
Copenhagen interpretation of QT, which was formulated by Niels Bohr, Werner 
Heisenberg, Max Born, and Wolfgang Pauli, have addressed this Gedankenexperimente, 
including the many-worlds interpretation (Hugh Everette and John Wheeler), the hidden-
variable interpretation (Frederik Belinfante and Max Jammer), the “disturbance model” 
(Nick Herbert), the alternative collapse model, or rather models (John von Neumann, 
Fritz London, Ernest Bauer, and Eugene Wigner), advanced-action interpretations, and 
others.  It is beyond the scope of this paper to go into a detailed analysis of these 
interpretations.14  It is worth mentioning, however, that all these attempts ended with 
interpretational problems of their own. 
 In order to resolve a problem, one should try to understand its source.  There are 
two very distinct entities involved in the paradox of Schrödinger’s cat:  the cat and the 
decaying particle.  The problem is that they belong to two very different domains 
recognized by contemporary physics, and the phenomena of the quantum micro domain 
appear to be absurd from the point of view of the macro domain.  It is the clash between 
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these two domains which creates the paradox of Schrodinger’s cat.  Thus the source of 
this paradox is the dualistic distinction between the macro and micro domain which is 
characteristic for the contemporary descriptions of physical reality, and the best 
illustration of this distinction is the conflict between theory of relativity, which is the 
main theory for describing the domain of macro phenomena on the cosmic scale, and 
quantum theory, which provides the principal description of the micro phenomena of the 
quantum universe.  The two theories do not use the same formalism, they recognize 
different laws of nature, and in general largely do not talk to each other. 
 So, the original question of the source of the paradox of Schrodinger's cat is 
transformed into another question:  Why is there this dualistic distinction between macro 
and micro domains in contemporary physics?  What is the source of this dualism? 
   Dualism is certainly not unique to contemporary physics.  Many other spheres of 
human knowledge reflect the dualistic perspective.  Dualism in the European intellectual 
tradition has a long history.   Arguably, the oldest and the most enduring dualism in this 
tradition is that between the subject and the object which survives to this day.  Dualism is 
also not unique to Europe but in fact is an integral part of many other intellectual 
traditions. 
 The dualistic perspective reaches far beyond the mere philosophical problems of 
subject-object relations and affects the very view of knowledge and knowledge 
acquisition, differentiating it into two distinct and largely mutually exclusive 
perspectives—rational and irrational.  Although most epistemologies tried at least to 
recognize the validity of both approaches, dualism has successfully resisted any 
productive synthesis.  Most attempts at synthesis generally place emphasis on one 
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approach at the expense of another.  One can see dualism at work, for example, in the 
European tradition in the distinction made between reason and faith. 
 It is interesting that although the European intellectual tradition has experienced 
many changes in the course of its evolution, dualism in it has remained largely intact.  
Secular knowledge that emerged during the Early Modern period represented in many 
ways a profound shift in its conception of reality by comparison with the Middle Ages.  
One of the results of this shift was the emergence of modern science with its analytical 
reductionist approach and atomism, as opposed to the holistic approach with an emphasis 
on faith which was predominant during the Middle Ages.  However, its conception of 
knowledge production remained essentially unchanged.  Just like in the Middle Ages, 
knowledge was not regarded as a product of construction, but rather as a more or less 
passive reflection of reality.  The process of the construction of knowledge was not 
recognized and, as a result, the focus of this perspective remained largely, as in Antiquity 
and the Middle Ages, on the object which was deemed to be completely separate from the 
largely passive subject. 
 The focus on the object certainly did not eliminate the real activity of the subject 
in constructing knowledge; it merely rendered this activity invisible and hence 
uncontrollable.  Rather then offer a critical control over the activities of the subject, this 
approach involved an unconscious and uncritical projection of the subject on the object.  
It is due to this unconscious projection that classical physics accepted the frame of the 
preferred knower—for example, a physicist like Newton—as the absolute frame, or 
absolute space. 
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 Since the space constructed by the preferred knower was regarded as absolute, all 
observed and even unobserved events had to be located in this space.  Hence, 
simultaneity of events could be established which led to the acceptance of the notion of 
absolute time.  Also, as a result of the uncritical projection of the agency of the knower 
on objects and their relations, the necessity of the agent’s action in constructing 
knowledge was projected onto relations among objects as necessary and deterministic, 
which gave rise to the largely anthropomorphic notion of laws of nature.  Time inversion 
was another consequence of the unconscious and uncritical modeling of spatio-temporal 
relations on the activity of the agent.  Finally, since the classical perspective knew only 
one preferred frame and since it did not know any speeds faster than the speed of light, it 
recognized the principle of locality which asserted that causal relations could not exceed 
the speed of light. 
 The beginning of the 20th century witnessed a radical transformation of modern 
physics.  The two most important innovations were the theory of relativity formulated 
largely by Albert Einstein and quantum theory of the Copenhageners.  The recognition of 
the agency of the knower was central to both innovations.  The introduction of the point-
of-view invariance for the frame of reference was seminal for TR.  In Einstein’s view, 
space should look invariant regardless of the frame chosen by the knower.  Einstein’s 
dictum was that no frame should be given preference.  This central tenet contained a 
powerful recognition that all frames are constructed and therefore all are equal.  The only 
non-relativistic component in Einstein’s picture of the universe was light.  The speed of 
light had to be the same in all frames, and therefore constant.  If it were not, then some 
frames had to be different from others.   
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 One of the logical consequences that followed from the acceptance of the speed of 
light constant was Einstein’s insistence on the classical principle of locality in his view of 
causality.  No causal relations in the universe should exceed the speed of light.  While 
Einstein recognized the agency of the knower in choosing/constructing frames of 
reference, his theory in general did not consistently incorporate the recognition of the 
process of construction. As a result, despite its significant differences from classical 
mechanics, theory of relativity retained dualism.  This dualism manifested itself, for 
example, in Einstein’s insistence on the classical separation between subject and object.  
Just like Newton, Einstein believed that it was possible to observe reality “without in any 
way disturbing the system” under observation.  Thus, despite his recognition of the role 
of agency in constructing frames, Einstein still largely associated knowledge with passive 
observing. 
 QT also marked a radical departure, and probably even more radical than that of 
TR, from classical mechanics.  It was much more consistent than the latter was in 
recognizing the agency of the knower.  It no longer viewed the knower as a passive 
observer but rather as an active agent whose interaction with the object radically changed 
it.  According to QT, for example, the knower radically affected, one could even say 
produced, the outcome of experiments (for example, measurements performed on a 
particle). 
 However, while QT recognized the agency of the knower, their description of 
reality still included a classical component.  The inclusion of the classical component 
related primarily to the conditions of the experiment.  It was with regard to the conditions 
of the experiment that the Copenhageners insisted on a classical description.  As Bohr 
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stressed, “. . . it is decisive to recognize that, however, far the phenomena transcend the 
scope of classical physical explanation, the account of all evidence must be expressed in 
classical terms.”15   
 There are several interpretations as to why the Copenhageners included the 
classical component in their description of reality, including one by the Copenhageners 
themselves.  Echoing the Copenhageners, Landsman argues in favor of pragmatic 
considerations, while Henry Stapp’s explanation stresses mere inertia.16  As I have argued 
elsewhere,17 the reasons for the inclusion appear to have more to do with the fact that 
although QT recognizes the relationship between the subject and the object, their 
epistemology does not fully integrate this recognition.  As a result, the process of the 
actual interaction between the subject and the object remains in QT just as mysterious as 
it is in classical mechanics; the only real difference between the two is that QT focuses on 
the subject while the focus in classical mechanics is on the object. 
 In the absence of a clear understanding of the interaction between the agent and 
the object, the focus on the knower rendered the object vague to the point of being a mere 
abstraction, a kind of Kantian “thing-in-itself.”  Schrödinger aptly described quantum 
mechanics as “a formal theory of frightening, indeed repulsive, abstractness and lack of 
visualizability.”18  As a result of their recognition of the agency of the knower, the 
Copenhageners faced a very serious problem:  their description of reality could be 
regarded as unacceptably subjective.  They needed to bring a degree of objectivity into 
their description and the only part of their description where they could do it was in their 
description of the aspect related to the knower.  Since they knew only one way to bring in 
objectivity—the classical way that posits separation between the observer and the 
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observed—they insisted on providing a classical description of the conditions of the 
experiment, that is, presuming that these conditions exist separately from the knower and 
that the knower “in no way affects” the description of these conditions. 
 Thus classical epistemology made its way into the new quantum description of 
reality.  As a result, the knower was displaced into a transcendent, critically uncontrolled, 
and preferred frame.  The consequence of this displacement was, just as in classical 
mechanics, the recognition of the frame constructed by the knower as the absolute frame 
for quantum events.19  Thus quantum theory abandoned the point-of-view invariance with 
regard to space incorporated by Albert Einstein into his theory of relativity.  The 
introduction of the absolute space permitted the establishment of simultaneity between 
quantum events which logically led to the recognition of absolute time for quantum 
events.  As Dirac has observed, “It [QT] is against the spirit of relativity, but it is the best 
we can do. . . . We cannot be content with such theory.”20 
 The quantum universe with its absolute space-time has become a very odd place 
indeed:  it allows speeds faster than the speed of light, permits systems to be in two 
different states at the same time (superposition), reverses the arrow of time and causality 
or even allows events that do not seem to have any cause at all, and last but not least, 
presents numerous examples of non-local behavior, or what Einstein sarcastically called 
“a spooky action at a distance.”  It is a universe of uncertain, random, indeterminate, and 
entangled events.  From the point of view of the physical universe which we experience 
in our daily life, quantum events appear to be paradoxical and even absurd. As Richard 
Feynman once remarked, “I think it is safe to say that no one understands quantum 
mechanics.”21  The paradoxes accepted in quantum mechanics vividly exemplify a radical 
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division of physical reality into two distinct and largely mutually exclusive domains and 
a resurgence of traditional dualism in contemporary physics. 
 Although over the years QT has led to many remarkable discoveries, it also has 
been and continues to be plagued by numerous problems.  Many in the field still wonder 
what kind of universe lurks behind its mathematical formalism and try to lift what they 
call “the fog from the north,” as they refer to the Copenhagen interpretation.  Adrian Kent 
articulates a very common concern when he writes: 
We know [from CI] that microscopic systems behave in a qualitatively different 
way, there is intrinsic randomness in the way they interact with the devices we 
use to probe them.  Much more impressively, for any given experiment we carry 
out on microscopic systems, we know how to list the possible outcomes and 
calculate the probabilities of each, at least to a very good approximation.  What 
we do not fully understand is why those calculations work:  we have, for example, 
no firmly established picture of what (if anything) is going on when we are not 
looking.22 
According to John Cramer, the author of the transaction interpretation of QT, the greatest 
weakness of QT 
. . . is not that it asserts an intrinsic randomness but that it supplies no insight into 
the nature or origin of this randomness.  If “God plays dice,” as Einstein has 
declined to believe, one would at least like a glimpse of the gaming apparatus that 
is in use.23 
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One clearly senses frustration in the words of the Russian physicist Lev Chebotaryov 
who laments the fact that seventy years after the advent of QT, “there is still no clear idea 
as to what its mathematics is actually telling us.”24 
 It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss in detail numerous attempts to 
reinterpret and bring more clarity to QT.  A cursory discussion of even the most 
important of these reinterpretations may easily be a topic for a book-length project.  It is 
worth, however, to mention a few alternatives to the Copenhagen interpretation, such as 
the hidden variables interpretation, the many worlds interpretation (Hugh Everette),25 the 
stochastic interpretation (Louis de Broglie, David Bohm, and Jean-Pierre Vigier),26 the 
delayed choice interpretation (John Wheeler),27 and interpretations involving information 
theory.  However, despite these numerous efforts and many remarkable discoveries, the 
picture of nature as described by QT remains quite “foggy.”   
 The continued split between TR and QT also presents problems for many 
physicists.  How can there be two physical realities?  How do they relate to each other?  
And where is the line that separates them?  In his well-known article appropriately titled 
“Do we really understand quantum mechanics?” Franck Lalöe writes:   
Logically, we are faced with a problem that did not exist before, when nobody 
thought that measurements should be treated as special process in physics.  We 
learn from Bohr that we should not try to transpose our experience of the 
everyday world to microscopic systems; this is fine, but where exactly is the limit 
between the two worlds?28 
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Many physicists see an urgent need for a synthesis of the two most important theoretical 
perspectives in modern physics.  The following reflection offered by John Baez 
summarizes the attitude of many in the field: 
General relativity and quantum field theory are based on some profound insights 
about the nature of reality.  These insights are crystallized in the form of 
mathematics, but there is a limit to how much progress we can make by just 
playing around with this mathematics.  We need to go back to the insights behind 
general relativity and quantum field theory, learn to hold them together in our 
minds, and dare to imagine a world more strange, more beautiful, but ultimately 
more reasonable than our current theories of it.29 
Adrian Kent echoes the same sentiment when he writes:  “. . . almost everyone suspects 
that a grander and more elegant unified theory . . . await us.”30 
Transactional Interpretation and the Legacy of Atomism 
 Although over the years there have been many attempts to reconcile QT and TR, 
the two theoretical perspectives remain deeply divided.  It is worth taking a closer look at 
least at one such very interesting attempt as it may help to understand better reasons for 
these failures.  In 1986 John G. Cramer, a physicist from the University of Washington, 
published the article entitled “The transactional interpretation of quantum mechanics” in 
the journal Review of Modern Physics.31  In this article Cramer advances a new 
interpretation of quantum formalism.  The new interpretation pursues two principal 
objectives.  First of all, Cramer wants to reconcile QT and TR by introducing into the 
quantum domain one of the main features of TR—the principle of invariability of space 
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frame, that is, Einstein’s condition sine qua non that the universe should look the same no 
matter what is the chosen frame of reference.  In Cramer’s own words: 
The transactional interpretation of quantum mechanics . . . is based on solutions of 
relativistically invariant differential field equations, is fully consistent with special 
relativity, and seems to accommodate these additional features of a relativistic 
quantum theory in a very natural way.  We are therefore confident that the 
interpretation presented here, perhaps with minor embellishments, is appropriate 
for the interpretation of a fully relativistic theory of quantum mechanics.32 
Secondly, Cramer wants to provide an interpretation that would go beyond the 
Copenhagen interpretation and offer a “conceptual model which provides the user with a 
way of clearly visualizing complicated quantum processes and of quickly analyzing 
seemingly ‘paradoxical situations.”  He makes it absolutely clear that his interpretation 
differs from the standard one in a “way of thinking rather than in a way of calculating.”  
He sees particular utility of his interpretation as a pedagogical device in helping students 
to visualize complex quantum processes.33 
 In contrast to the standard interpretation which is predicated on the absolute space 
frame, Cramer recognizes that the emitter and the absorber have different frames.  The 
recognition of two different frames—that is, the recognition of the non-local nature of the 
interaction between emitter and absorber—poses a problem in explaining the enforced 
correlation in polarizations in the two frames.  According to Cramer, this correlation is 
achieved via a standing wave formed by the superposition of a retarded, or in his 
terminology offer wave (OW) from emitter to absorber, and the advanced, or 
confirmation wave (CW) from absorber to emitter).  Cramer provides a detailed 
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description of the causal sequence in this superposition of waves.  First, emitter produces 
an offer wave, which travels to absorber.  When it arrives, it causes absorber to produce a 
confirmation wave.  This wave travels back to emitter where it is evaluated.  This cycle is 
repeated until the “exchange of energy and other conserved quantities satisfies the 
quantum boundary conditions of the system,” at which point the transaction is 
completed.34   
 There is one problem with this description:  all these sequential exchanges of 
offering and confirmation waves take place before an observer can see the complete 
transaction which is interpreted “as the passage of a single retarded (i.e., positive-energy) 
photon traveling at the speed of light from emitter to absorber.”35  Therefore, they should 
occur at speeds that exceed the speed of light, which contradicts theory of relativity.  So 
Cramer faces a dilemma:  either he should abandon quantum non-locality or accept 
phenomena that are incompatible with the theory of relativity.  Cramer is certainly not 
unaware of this tension.  He writes: 
It is perceived by some that non-locality must be in direct conflict with special 
relativity because it could be used at least at the level of Gendankenexperimente” 
for “true” determinations of relativistic simultaneity and must be in conflict with 
causality because it offers a possibility of backward-in-time signaling.36  
Cramer’s solution to this problem is atemporality.  He argues that transaction exchanges 
take place outside of time: 
Since the transaction is atemporal, forming along the entire interval separating 
emission locus from absorption locus “at once,” it makes no difference to the 
outcome or the transactional description if separated experiments occur 
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“simultaneously” or in any time sequence.  Both measurements participate 
equally and symmetrically in the formation of the transaction.37 
Thus Cramer salvages both quantum non-locality and relativistic invariance.  His 
interpretation “is explicitly non-local but it is also relativistically invariant and fully 
causal.”38 
 This explanation, however, raises one problem:  if transaction exchanges take 
place outside of time, they are certainly not outside of space.  Because they are outside of 
time, they appear to the observer as instantaneous.  This fact allows the observer to 
establish the fact of simultaneity between two different space frames—one of emitter and 
the other of absorber—which contradicts the theory of relativity explicitly precluding 
such possibility.  An attempt by the Russian physicist Pavel Kurakin and his colleagues 
George Malinetskii and Howard Bloom to build on Cramer’s interpretation has hardly 
been more successful.  They proposed a “conversational,” or “dialogue model of quantum 
transitions.” 39   Here is the crux of their interpretation in their own succinct summary:   
We propose that the source of a particle and all of that particle’s possible 
detectors “talk” before the particle is finally observed by just one detector.  These 
talks do not take place in physical time.  They occur in what we call “hidden 
time.”  Talks are spatially organized in such a way that the model reproduces 
standard quantum probability amplitudes.40 
However, their proposed “hidden time” hardly resolves the contradiction between non-
locality and relativistic invariability.   
 It is worth noting that Cramer’s interpretation, despite its obvious innovations, 
remains decidedly traditionalist in its atomistic approach, that is, he sees quantum 
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interactions as essentially interactions between two individual quantum systems.  The 
reductionist atomistic approach and its rational analytical methodology re-emerged 
during the Early Modern period largely in opposition to the holistic approach and reliance 
on faith prevalent during the Middle Ages.  Although this approach is in many respects 
very different from the medieval holistic perspective, there is one aspect that the two 
approaches share:  they both set the part and the whole in a binary opposition to each 
other, except that the medieval perspective emphasizes the whole over the part, and the 
modern scientific perspective emphasizes the part over the whole.   
 The failure to achieve the integration of contemporary physics within the 
framework of the atomistic reductionist approach suggests the necessity of a 
philosophical rethinking of the applicability of this approach.  John Small voices the 
opinion of the growing number of physicists when he writes:  
We need to go back to the insights behind general relativity and quantum field 
theory, learn to hold them together in our minds, and dare to imagine a world 
more strange, more beautiful, but ultimately more reasonable than our current 
theories of it.  For this daunting task, philosophical reflection is bound to be of 
help.41 
Self-Organization:  a New Paradigm 
 As the above discussion of paradoxes in contemporary physics suggests, these 
paradoxes are in a large degree due to the failure of QT and TR to integrate fully the 
subject into their description or reality.  As the above also indicates, and as I have argued 
elsewhere relying largely on the work of Swiss psychologist Jean Piaget,42 the subject 
and the object are intimately related to each other by the process of construction.  Piaget 
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was one of the first thinkers who focused on this process.  According to Piaget’s many 
remarkable studies, and most notably his early empirical work on the origin of 
intelligence in children, 43 the subject and the object are not givens; they are products of 
our construction of knowledge about reality.  It is the process of construction that is the 
source of both.  And it is this process that integrally connects both the subject and the 
object which constitute the two poles of this continuum.  Therefore, when we disregard 
the process of construction and focus our attention on either or both of the two poles—the 
products of construction—they naturally appear to us as disconnected and radically 
distinct.   
 The focus on the subject and the object has been and continues to be dominant in 
our view of reality at the expense of the process of construction.  As a result, in this view 
the subject and the object remain radically separated from and largely opposed to each 
other.  This focus was and continues to be the source of enduring dualism in our thinking.  
Therefore, the resolution of the problem of paradoxes in contemporary physics should 
involve, as John Small suggests, a philosophical re-thinking of its epistemological 
approach.  The shifting of the focus to the process of construction may be instrumental to 
such re-thinking.  One of the most important and productive among modern theoretical 
perspectives which focus on the process of construction is theory of self-organization. 
 Although theory of self-organization is not yet widely acceptable in QT, it is not 
entirely alien to it either.  In fact, QT has always regarded quantum objects as complex 
dissipative systems.  Both Bohr and Heisenberg referred to quantum systems when 
describing interactions in quantum mechanics.  A description of quantum non-locality by 
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the Indian physicist Ashok Sengupta is very reminiscent of the language used in theory of 
self-organization: 
Quantum non-locality is a natural consequence of quantum entanglement that 
assigns multipartite systems with definite properties at the expense of the 
individual constituents thereby rendering it impossible to reconstruct the state of a 
composite from knowledge of its parts.44 
The Russian physicist Vladimir Manasson asks in the title of his paper: “Are Particles 
Self-Organized Systems?”45  Chinese physicist Xiao Gang Wen thinks in a similar vein 
when he writes: 
Why don’t we regard photons and fermions as emergent quasi-particles like 
phonons?  It seems there does not exist any order that gives rise to massless 
photons and nearly-massless fermions.  This may be the reason why re regard 
photons and fermions as elementary particles.46 
Other physicists make similar connections between quantum processes and theory of self-
organization.47  Pavel Kurakin and George Malinetskii, for example, even go so far as to 
evoke analogies between paradoxes of quantum mechanics and the processes of self-
organization among bees.48 
 The term “self-organization” refers broadly to processes which lead to the 
emergence of entities with properties that cannot be traced to individual parts involved in 
their emergence.  Iain Couzin cites the following definition of self-organization provided 
by S. Camazine et al.  In this definition, self-organization is  
. . . a process in which pattern at the global level of a system emerges solely from 
numerous interactions among the lower-level components of a system.  Moreover, 
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the rules specifying interactions among the system’s components are executed 
using only local information, without reference to the global pattern.49  
As the computer scientist James Odell succinctly puts it, an emergent complex system “is 
more than just the sum of its parts.”50  Theory of emergence and the concept of non-
linearity are also commonly used in describing self-organized complex systems51—a 
view that goes back to Michael Polany’s theory of boundary conditions that form 
constraining regulating processes.52  Finally, self-organized system are also often 
characterized as dissipative—a characteristic that stresses their capacity to increase 
entropy in their environment while sustaining and developing their own organization.  
 Theory of self-organization is inherently interdisciplinary.  It is intimately related 
to several theoretical perspectives, such as theory of catastrophe, chaos theory, theory of 
complex dissipative structures, theory of autopoiesis, theory of complexity, emergence 
theory, and information theory.53  All these theoretical perspectives focus on a broad 
range of phenomena that occur both in the macro and the micro domain and cover many 
disciplines which study different levels of the organization of reality:  from physics and 
chemistry to meteorology and weather science, to computer science, biology, psychology, 
economics, sociology, and linguistics.  The theory of self-organization underlies, for 
example, studies of such diverse phenomena as collective behavior of animals,54 insect 
behavior and swarm intelligence,55 ball lightning,56 weather patterns,57 behavior patterns 
of fish schools,58 and even linguistic processes.59 
 The emergence of new properties in self-organized systems attracts much 
attention.  Many researchers see self-organization as the source of these properties 
whereby the interaction of individual parts on the local level leads to the emergence of 
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global patterns constituting new properties.  Jean Piaget shows, for example, how the 
mechanism of self-organization operates in mental processes.  His study of the 
emergence of conscious intelligence in children demonstrates how conservation of 
individual reflex functions, such as hearing or seeing, leads to their combination and the 
emergence of a more powerful operation capable of creating permanent mental images, 
which is the first step in the rise of consciousness. Among other things, Piaget’s study 
also shows that  the part and the whole, which are commonly regarded as standing 
opposed to each other, are simply aspects of the same process of construction and do not 
stand in radical opposition to each other. 60   Individual functions interact in creating a 
whole that is not reducible to these functions.  This whole, or the new function, is much 
more powerful than each individual function involved in the combination.  This 
combination is capable of a number of operations that exceeds the number of operations 
that can be performed by the mere sum of individual operations involved in the 
combination.  The transition from individual functions to a whole seamlessly combines 
both continuity and discontinuity.  It is only when we remove from our field of vision the 
process of construction that part and whole, continuity and discontinuity, and other 
binaries begin to appear as opposed to each other. 
 It is interesting to point out that in self-organized systems locality and non-
locality are also not opposed to each other but reflect an integrated and cooperative aspect 
of the system’s behavior.  According to Eric Bonabeau, for example, self-organization 
involves 
. . . a set of dynamical mechanisms whereby structure appears at the global level 
of a system from interactions among its lower-level components; the rules 
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specifying the interaction among the system’s constituent units are executed on 
the basis of purely local information, without reference to the global pattern, 
which is an emergent property of the system rather than a property imposed upon 
the system by an external ordering influence.61 
In his study of fish schools, Dmitrii Radakov also points to the connection between the 
local and the non-local in self-organized systems.  He emphasizes that the behavior of 
such systems “need not be explained as a phenomenon coordinated by a leader, or by 
global information, but by the rapid propagation of local information about the motion of 
near neighbors.”62  He explains that the parts that constitute a self-organized system react 
to the behavior and position of their immediate neighbors, not to some “global 
information” or “leader,” so information is passed locally in accordance with physical 
laws; however, due to self-organization, the effects of this locally passed information on 
the global behavior of the system appears to disobey physical laws.63  The same pattern 
of local interaction with global effects is involved in the phenomenon which is called 
stigmergy whereby local information passed via pheromone affects the global behavior of 
an ant colony.64  In linguistic studies, for example, Vito Pirelli and his collaborators show 
how the processing of verbal inputs through local interactions between parallel 
processing neurons leads to the emergence of global (non-local) ordering constraints.65  
 The peculiar connection between the local and the non-local in self-organized 
systems may explain, for example, the phenomena observed in self-organized quantum 
systems that appear to violate what Einstein considered to be one of the fundamental 
constants in nature—the speed of light—or the causal relationship whereby effects 
precede the cause or may even appear as having no cause at all, that is being totally 
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random.  Indeed, if local and non-local are intimately connected in self-organized 
systems and the effects of local interactions that occur in accordance with the laws of 
nature and its constants have global effects, then the effects of the local interaction on the 
global level may appear in violation of these laws and constants.  In other words, events 
that happen on the local level at the speed of light and in accordance with natural laws are 
extended to the global level.  In this case, their local effects are magnified due to self-
organization and, naturally, would appear to violate these laws on the global level if self-
organization is not taken into consideration.  
 In light of the peculiar effects of self-organization, one can understand the reason 
for the failure of the reductionist atomistic approach to resolve the paradoxes in quantum 
mechanics.  Sengupta, for example, explains that  
A complex system behaves in an organized collective manner with properties that 
cannot be identified with any of the individual parts but arise from the structure as 
a whole:  these systems cannot dismantle into their components without 
destroying themselves.66 
Obviously, when the reductionist approach views the behavior of the system from the 
perspective of interaction between two individual and non-local particles, which in fact, 
do not interact directly but only as components the whole system, apparent paradoxes and 
inconsistencies will be an inevitable consequence. 
 The interdisciplinary nature of theory of self-organization suggests a certain 
isomorphism among different levels of organization of reality.  Josephson, for example, 
notes deep parallels that appear to exist between patterns found at the physical level and 
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patterns found in mental processes.  Reflecting on the connection between two levels of 
organization, he writes: 
The details of quantum physics and biology are very different.  But we argued 
that they might nevertheless be derivative of some common underlying subtler 
background process, in the same way that waves and particles emerge from a 
common subtler domain, that of quantum mechanics and in some cases share 
certain features such as propagation along a trajectory.67 
Vladimir Manasson also points to the interdisciplinary nature of self-organization 
research when he writes that in order to “understand the overall SOS behavior, it is often 
sufficient to use qualitative analysis and study proto-type system that belongs to the 
‘proper’ dynamical class.”68 
 The isomorphism of the process of self-organization may be an important factor 
in creating a bridge between the micro and macro domain and resolving the problem of 
the fundamental division in contemporary physics.  It suggests a vision of reality as a 
nested hierarchy of cascading levels of organization which, although fundamentally 
different and irreducible to each other, are nevertheless intimately related in their patterns 
of emergence and transformation.   
Halzhey observes:   
While this [universal applicability of the theory of self-organization] would also 
apply, for instance, to the fundamental laws of physics, applicability on all scales 
engenders in the case of self-organization an even more sublime image, namely 
the image of an infinite series of hierarchically nested levels that are analogous to 
each other. . . . The homology across different scales pertains therefore rather to 
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processes of emergence or to the transition between levels than to the levels 
themselves.69  
 These observations imply that the exploration of interdisciplinary paths of 
theorizing in the context of theory of self-organization and other theoretical perspectives 
associated with it may offer a key to resolving paradoxes in contemporary physics which 
result from the radical differentiation of the micro and the macro domain, including the 
paradox of Schrödinger’s cat.  T. Palmer, for example, points in this direction in his 
discussion of the patterns of self-similar upscale cascading and the so-called 
“meteorological Butterfly effect” which he sees as offering a possibility “of overcoming 
some of the objections to marrying chaos theory and quantum theory.”70   
 This discussion of paradoxes in contemporary physics suggests that paradoxes are 
intimately associated with the process of construction.  They appear when a newly 
emergent structure clashes with its constituent substructures.  This clash is largely due to 
the fact that the newly emergent structure, as a combination of structures involved in its 
creation, is much more powerful, that is, has a much greater combinatorial capability, and 
hence is capable of constructing more statements, than the latter; hence paradoxes.  
Paradoxes that we encounter appear as a result of our advances in knowledge and are 
produced by the conflict between the emergent cognitive structure and those structures 
that are involved in its emergence.  This conflict can be resolved only through the process 
of equilibration, or adaptation.  The result of such equilibration will be further advances 
in knowledge, new sources of disequilibrium, and, inevitably, other paradoxes.  As I have 
argued elsewhere,71 conservation and regulation are the two processes that play a key role 
in this regard.  Any knowledge structure requires regulation to conserve itself.  And such 
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regulation will eventually evolve into a new structure that will in turn also require 
regulation.  The construction of knowledge is, indeed, an infinite process.   
Point-Of-View Invariance 
 The conception that emphasizes the constructed, rather than reflective nature of 
knowledge does not necessarily have to lead one, as it did Post-Modernists, to a 
pessimistic conclusion that there can be no correspondence between our knowledge and 
reality and that objective knowledge is in principle unattainable.  It is worth noting, that 
the dualism underlying the dichotomy between the object and the subject is largely a 
result of the currently prevalent approach to knowledge which pays little attention to the 
process of construction.  Both subject and object are merely aspects of the process of 
construction that appear to be opposed to each other when the process of construction is 
disregarded.  The question whether objective knowledge is possible is really a false 
question, indeed, generated by this dualistic perspective.  Our experience confirms that it 
is possible to establish correspondences between what we know and what is out there.  
The real question is not whether we can have objective knowledge.  The real question is:  
How do we attain such knowledge?  What do we do to produce knowledge that 
corresponds to reality? 
 The most important criterion of objective knowledge is invariance, or point-of-
view invariance (POVI).  As Victor Stenger points out, “If the models of physics are to 
describe observations based on an objective reality, then those models cannot depend of 
the point of view of the observer.  This suggests the principle of point-of-view invariance 
. . .  .“72  Newton introduced POVI with regard to the direction of motion.  His laws are 
invariant in relation to the direction.  One of the great achievements of Einstein was to 
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generalize POVI to space-time.  In his view, no space-time frame is preferable to any 
other, and the constancy of the speed of light was the guarantee of this invariability.  
However, while Einstein established the principle of invariability of space-time, which 
implicitly recognized the agency of the knower in constructing space-time frames, he did 
not fully embrace this agency.  He did not recognize that the act of knowing affected all 
systems and that the condition of observing a system “without in any way affecting it” 
was an impossibility. 
 QT reflects keen awareness of the impact that the knower has on the object of 
knowing.  However, without a clear understanding of the processes involved in knowing, 
its epistemology could appear unacceptably subjective.  The notion that reality could only 
be known subjectively was totally unacceptable to the creators of QT.  They had to 
incorporate objectivity into their theory.  However, the only conception of objectivity that 
was available to them was a classical one, that is, the one that did not recognize the 
connection between the agent and the object of knowing.  The Copenhageners certainly 
could not apply this conception of objectivity to quantum objects since that would mean a 
rejection of their most important theoretical innovation.  Therefore, they applied it to the 
conditions of the experiment set up by the agent.  They required a classical description of 
the conditions of a quantum experiment.  But what would constitute such description?  
The classical description of the object is a description that requires isolation of the object 
from the knower.  By analogy, a classical description of the conditions of an experiment 
should also presuppose isolation of these conditions from the knower. But how such 
isolation is supposed to be achieved?  How are we supposed to remove subjectivity from 
the knowledge of the conditions of the experiment?  Could we remove our subjective 
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biases from our descriptions?  Wouldn’t such claims of removal simply place the subject 
with his or her biases into a transcendent position?  And wouldn’t further repetitions of 
this operation of removal simply lead to an infinite regress?  These questions suggest that 
while QT recognized the agency of the knower, it did not successfully generalize POVI 
to all action.  It did not establish a framework which would not privilege one action over 
another; it does not incorporate the knower into the process of knowing.   
 Nothing is more fundamental to reality than change, and change is the product of 
action.  Therefore action is the most important property of reality.  Following Hamilton’s 
principle of stationary action, that is, action invariant in all cases, Basilio Catania, for 
example, sees kinship between physical action (for example, energy and momentum) and 
knowledge, or information.  According to Catania, 
. . . action is the fundamental invariant describing any kind of change in 
the outer world of the observer, much the same as information is the 
fundamental invariant describing change in the inner world (mind) of the 
observer . . . . It therefore appears that action may be seen today as the 
unifying quantity of all physical quantities, much the same as Giovanni 
Giorgi saw energy playing that role in 1901. 73 
Catania, for example, finds that Plank’s constant ħ can be used to measure both actions—
the physical change external to the knower and inner changes in knowledge.  If, indeed, 
action is the most fundamental property of reality, then objective knowledge requires that 
POVI should be extended to action. 
 In order to extend POVI to action, one should find a point which is common to all 
actions and view reality from this point.  The process of construction is fundamental to 
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the evolution of reality.  It is this process that generates change.  As I have argued in one 
of my papers, the most important characteristic of this process is the equilibrium between 
equilibrium and disequilibrium.  It is this equilibrium that allows the process of 
construction to move constantly forward without erupting into chaos.  The locus of this 
equilibrium can be properly described as being at the “edge of chaos.”  I have also argued 
that it is precisely this balance that regulates the process of construction and therefore 
offers a position from which to reflect on the entire process.  It allows the knower to 
reflect on one’s own knowing, on the process of construction, and thus incorporate the 
knower into the process of knowing.74  Therefore, in order to extend POVI to action one 
should view reality from the vantage point of this fundamental symmetry.  This approach 
gives no preference to any frame of action or any knowledge-product of any action. 
 The focus on the process of construction helps to understand better why it is 
possible to establish correspondences between our knowledge and reality.  First of all, in 
accordance with this theoretical perspective, the production of knowledge is isomorphic 
to other processes of construction that operate in reality.  This view is totally consistent 
with the evolutionary approach to the study of reality.  Cognitive processes emerge from 
biological ones which, in turn, developed from the processes that occur at the physical 
and chemical levels of organization of reality.  What one author has described as “an 
unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences” is a good example of 
this isomorphism.75  Just as the processes of construction in nature are real, so are the 
constructions effected by our mind.  Secondly, as Piaget has convincingly showed, our 
consciousness and our knowledge are products of our interaction with the real world and, 
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therefore, are real.76  These two important facts are what make correspondences between 
what we know and reality possible.  
 Possibility, however, is no guarantee.  That is why there are a number of 
important criteria that have been established for attaining objective knowledge.  
Inclusiveness is one of them:  the more inclusive is our interpretation of reality, the more 
it incorporates other theoretical perspectives as its specific cases, the greater the 
likelihood of its invariant objectivity.  Criticality is another important criterion, that is, 
the more critical is our theory, the more it includes the knower into the process of 
interpreting reality, the more the knower is aware of his or her knowing biases, the more 
objective the interpretation is likely to be .  Finally, there are well established practices of 
experimental and evidentiary confirmation. 
 The above considerations confirm a well-known empirical fact that we are 
capable of attaining knowledge that corresponds to the real world.  Although the process 
of construction, and the production of knowledge is one of its manifestations, is infinite, 
its specific products are not.  In view of this fact, it is possible to have finite and fully 
objective knowledge of finite objects. 
Conclusion 
  As this paper has shown, paradoxes are essential products of the process of 
construction.  Paradoxes announce the presence of a new and more powerful cognitive 
structure.  It is the conflict between this new emergent structure and the structure which 
led to its emergence that is the source of the perturbation that we experience as paradox, 
that is, statements that are true and false at the same time—true if viewed from the point 
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of view of the former but unjustifiable and hence perturbing when viewed from the point 
of view of the latter.    
 This view suggests that the only one way to deal with perturbations that create 
paradoxes is to move boldly forward and embrace the emergent structure.  The structure 
that led to its emergence should be equilibrated with the emergent structure and become a 
particular case within its more powerful framework.  Thus the resolution of the problem 
of paradox lies in a bold construction of new knowledge. 
 The theoretical vision outlined in this paper offers a new perspective on paradoxes 
and their role.  Viewed from this perspective, paradoxes cease to appear as indications of 
structural limitations to human knowledge.  Rather, they become powerful tools in the 
production of knowledge.  This perspective allows the knower the freedom of critical 
insight, a capacity to inquire into the basis of one’s own knowledge, and ultimately a 
better control over the process of construction and, hence, its greater efficiency.  An 
understanding of the process of construction will allow us to become masters of our own 
creativity.  By controlling this process we can learn to be creative when we want to, not 
only when we can.  Rather than suffuse, as we often do, the production of knowledge in a 
futile and wasteful exercise of power, we can turn it into a more efficient, more 
cooperative, more orderly, and ultimately much more enjoyable process. 
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